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Abstract
This paper is an exploration of the role of doubt and sensations in the development of an understanding
of an object. Inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, I
begin by arguing that understanding is a circular process that begins with a pre-understanding that is
then refuted by the intended or inferred as-structure of an object. The belief found to settle the doubt
that comes from such a refutation is one’s understanding of said object as that object. In the second
part of this paper, I explore a method to harness this circular process to facilitate a comprehensive
understanding of an object as that object.
Introduction
A story is often a description of the relationship of

of understanding, namely, the hermeneutic circle. In

some character(s) to some other character(s). The

order to better understand Gadamer’s position, I bring

author of the story provides meaning to each character

in Heidegger to articulate the as-structure of an object

by bestowing upon them a role within the world, that

and one’s fore-understanding concerning said object.

is, a part which helps the story become a tale worth

Although Gadamer provides the framework for the

telling. In a similar manner, objects are characters in

circular process of understanding, it is doubt, in the

the story of understanding the world around oneself.

Peircean sense, that motivates thought to go through

Much like the characters in a traditional story, objects

the circular process to acquire an understanding of

as such fulfil a role designated by an ‘author’ who

an object as that object. In other words, doubt leads

understands his objects as well as those of others

to an understanding. Finally, I argue that the circular

through the circular process of understanding.

process of understanding, with the assistance of what I

This paper is an argument for a method of
harnessing this process as a means to form an

call the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, is the method one
should use to obtain an understanding of an object.

understanding of an object. To this end, I bring a
few philosophers into conversation with one another,
namely, Charles Sanders Peirce, Martin Heidegger,

Part I:
Understanding an Object

and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Peirce serves to introduce

Peirce

doubt and its role in the motivation of thought into

According to Peirce,

the pursuit of belief. Despite the power of his ideas,

[d]oubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state

he does not sufficiently explain the process by which

from which we struggle to free ourselves

thought obtains an understanding. For that, I turn to

and pass into a belief . . . The feeling of

Gadamer, who defends a sound and magnificent art

believing is a more or less sure indication
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of there being established in our nature

is independent of whether one feels any symptoms

some habit which will determine our

indicating the issue. As an example, suppose I was

actions. Doubt never has such an effect.

faced with a food that smelt bad to me, but my

1

Simply put, a belief is thought’s attempt to settle

friends urged me to try it. Here, a doubt could

doubt: the lack of any thought that can inspire action.

be raised in respect to whether I should trust my

In doubt, one has an ‘uneasy and dissatisfied feeling’

negative internal reaction to the smell or my friend’s

and may find oneself unable to form any thoughts on

judgement.7 If a belief is found and, say, I trust my

the matter that raised the doubt. This mental inaction

friends’ claim that the food is worth the try, I would

causes thought to begin “a struggle to attain a state of

no longer be in doubt since I would have decided

belief,” that is, a “calm and satisfactory state.”2

to trust my friends and take a bite. Just like a pain

Furthermore, “. . .the action of thought is excited

killer, so long as this belief takes away the symptoms

by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief

of doubt, I will not be disturbed by the irritation of

is attained; so, the production of belief is the sole

indecision, at least momentarily.

function of thought.”3 The irritation of doubt causes

To demonstrate the point that many such beliefs

the action of thought which is a struggle that aims

can be formed, consider the following scenarios. If

to settle doubt into belief. Once a belief is obtained,

one of my friends had suddenly passed out, a fire

thought no longer struggles and so it becomes

had started, or any sufficiently dramatic event had

‘motionless,’ so to speak. This implies that thought’s

occurred, a belief concerning whether to give the

sole purpose is the formation of beliefs that aim to

decision any attention would be found, that is, I

settle the irritation of doubt. As Peirce eloquently puts

would have formed the belief that a decision about

it, “[t]hought in action has for its only possible motive

the food is irrelevant. This belief would be sufficient

the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does

to remove the feeling of doubt concerning whom to

not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself.”

trust. However, the source of the doubt would remain

4

Having found a belief that works, “we cling

unresolved. This implies that such a doubt could show

tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing

up at some point in my life. It is worth noting that

just what we do believe.”5 Whatever belief can free us

to Peirce, the absolute resolution of doubt is better

from the unease of doubt is one we may adopt and

than the temporary alleviation of the feeling of doubt

be reluctant to let go to avoid the feelings that come

since said doubt will no longer rise again. In this way,

with doubt once more. These feelings are like the pain

one would possess an understanding of that which

of a headache. The pain, a symptom of the problem,

occasioned the doubt. Only by taking a bite of the

can be alleviated with pain killers. As a result, they

food can I truly resolve my hesitancy about trusting

allow one to go on with one’s day as if nothing

my nose or my friends for I would form a belief

were the matter. However, the problem that caused

grounded in sensations that come from reality.

the headache to begin with is still there. In other
words, there is a reality about one’s headache that
6

1
2
3
4
5
6

 e Fixation of Belief, 121.
Th
The Fixation of Belief, 121.
How to Make Ideas Clear, 289.
How to Make Ideas Clear, 291.
Fixation of Belief, 121.
How to Make Ideas Clear, 298.

Sensations are those elements of consciousness
that “are completely present at every instant, so long

7

— 2 —

I t should be noted, here, that the doubt is not in respect
to the taste of the food, but rather to the source of
authority in deciding to try a bite of the food. In other
words, I am in doubt of whether to trust my nose or my
friends to make a decision.
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as they last;”8 be it a smell, sight, sound, or touch,

Although the existence of the imagination is a real

there is always something being sensed. On the other

phenomenon, the elements of the imagination are just

hand, like the air in between musical notes, thoughts

expressions of the thinker’s thoughts. Since, to Peirce,

“are [mental] actions having beginning, middle, and

the source of one’s doubt lies within sensations and

end, and consist in the succession of sensations which

the feeling of being in doubt lies within thoughts, it

flow through the mind.”9 In other words, thoughts

follows that the feeling can be momentarily alleviated

are those elements of consciousness that depend on

by many beliefs, fictional or otherwise, but the source

sensations and are formed in response to them. As an

of doubt can only be resolved by engaging reality.

example, take a moment to place your hands on any
surface near you and notice the thoughts that arise.

Response to Peirce

The existence of the pressure you feel in your hands

Peirce has, in my opinion, accurately described why

is a ceaseless sensation. Placing your hands elsewhere

beliefs are formed and the stimulus needed for thought

would only change the quality of the pressure rather

to begin the struggle for a belief. Being in a state of

than the existence of said pressure. Although the

doubt spurs thought into action to find a belief that

particular feeling one senses changes over time,

will settle that doubt. However, he seems to have

sensation itself is ceaseless, so long as one lives. Now,

overlooked the details of how thought forms a belief.

recall your thoughts as you felt. What did you first

Being more interested in a method that

think of as you began to feel? What are you thinking

effectively and efficiently produces true beliefs, Peirce

of now? The thoughts, to Peirce, are certainly not

answers the ‘how question’ with a brief description:

the same. The first thought rose up in your mind,

Images pass rapidly through

then went away, to let another thought appear in

consciousness, one incessantly melting

your mind. Hence, unlike sensations, thoughts come

into another, until at last, when all is

and go. These prolonged sensations and short-lived

over—it may be in a fraction of a second,

thoughts are both needed to understand reality in the

in an hour, or after long years—we find

Peircean sense.

ourselves decided as to how we should

According to Pierce, “. . .we may define the real

act under such circumstances as those

as that whose characters are independent of what

which occasioned our hesitation. In other

anybody may think them to be.”10 Real things are

words, we have attained a belief.12

those phenomena that are independent from one’s

Although brief for the sake of his arguments, the

thoughts. This implies that sensations are a part of

details of the interaction of thought with other

reality whilst the interpretation of those sensations

mental constituents in the formation of belief is of

may either be fictional or truthful. A fiction is an

great importance when thinking of ways to ensure

arrangement of sensations in one’s imagination which

the formation of a truth oriented belief, namely, an

is completely dependent on the thinker. Such “[a]

understanding.

figment is a product of somebody’s imagination; it has
such characters as his thought impresses upon it.”11

In need of a deeper dive into the formation
of such beliefs, I turn my attention to Gadamer’s
thoughts on understanding.

8
9
10
11

 ow to Make Ideas Clear, 290.
H
How to Make Ideas Clear, 290.
How to Make Ideas Clear, 298.
How to Make Ideas Clear, 298.

12 How to Make Ideas Clear, 290.
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Gadamer In Consideration of Heidegger

object as that object.”20 In other words, the meaning

Similar to Peirce, a confrontation of one’s

of an object is the interpretation of the object as that

understanding from the engagement of an object

object. With this being established, I move one to

or, for Gadamer, a text must occur for the process

Heidegger’s three fore-structures.
Fore-having is the “prior awareness as to the

of belief formation or, in his case, understanding
to begin. In other words, Gadamer maintains that

function and purpose of the parts” of an object “for

understanding follows the hermeneutic circle.13

the as-structure to become explicit.”21 One possesses

Initially, one has a “pre-understanding”14 of a text,

a pre-understanding of the parts of an object which

that is, certain prejudices and fore-structures – fore-

allow these parts to be made manifest to consciousness

having, fore-sight, and fore-conception – one uses to

if needed. In the case of a pen, one ignores the ink,

make sense of a text. Then, upon being confronted

the tip, the gel, and so on because one treats the

by an unfamiliarity within the text, one’s pre-

pen as a means to express a message rather than a

understanding thereof is challenged which leads to

collection of separate objects. However, pressing down

the formulation of a new and so more comprehensive

on the button that brings out the tip demonstrates

understanding of the text. This new understanding

that one possesses a pre-understanding of the different

would then become one’s new pre-understanding of

parts that make the pen work. This pre-understanding

the text. Here, the circle begins anew.

is one’s ‘fore-having.’

15

The ability to be able to turn one’s attention

Since the fore-structures of understanding
depend on Heidegger’s understanding of an object as

to a particular part of an object for some reason is

that object, that is, the as-structure of an object, I

fore-sight.22 Only when a significant event occurs is

begin this section by investigating said as-structure.

attention drawn away from the object as said object

Heidegger understands the “world as ready-at-hand”

and towards the parts which are potential causes of

which means that an object has a significance with

the event. For example, if a toaster does not heat up

respect to the interpretation one has of the function

when set in action, attention turns away from ‘making

of the object. In other words, the meaning of an

toast’ to the different parts of the machine, “which

object is in-order-to do something. For example,

are based on [one’s] knowledge of how the [toaster]

a pen as a pen can be interpreted as in-order-to

operates.”23 This “isolation of the possible problem

write by hand. Also, a bicycle as a bicycle can be

area is called “fore-sight” by Heidegger.”24

16

17

18

The interpretation of an object that makes the

interpreted as in-order-to take a person from place to
place. In general, the as-structure of an object is “the

as-structure of the object explicit to consciousness is

manner or purpose for which” one makes use of an

one’s fore-conception. “That is, the as-structure is, in

object. The significance of an object as that object

the fore-conception, made explicit.”25 If a toaster does

depends on one’s “articulating or emphasizing the

not heat the bread then the “attitude or disposition”

in-order-to of a particular object, which is to see the

that leads one to interpret the unplugged cable as the

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

19

 e Hermeneutic Circle, 232.
Th
Making Space for Knowing, 70.
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 95-97.
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 94-95.
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 95.
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 95.
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 95.
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source of the problem would be fore-conception.26 If

overall understanding of the text before engaging

it were plugged in and the toaster still did not work,

the text. To Gadamer, this fore-projection works in

then one might think that the cable is not functioning

conjunction to one’s prejudices in the hermeneutic

as a cable because some wire, a component of the

circle when attempting to understand a text.31

cable, is not functioning as it should. Here, the as-

To begin the hermeneutic circle, one “must be

structure of the cable and the wire are being made

on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations

explicit to consciousness. In this way, the fore-

imposed by imperceptible habits of thought”

conception is the pre-understanding of an object that

which are one’s prejudices.32 These prejudices guide

makes the as-structure of that object explicit.27

the interpretation of a text and so are cause for a

The fore-structures in addition to what Gadamer

misunderstanding of the text. When reading a word,

calls prejudices forms the totality of the pre-

one naturally interprets the word in the context in

understanding of an object. A prejudice to Gadamer is

which it was originally learned. By not making the

a judgement cast on an object, text, or practice prior

initial understanding of the text conscious, one fails

to the engagement of a particular matter. For example,

to grasp the intended message of the text. Hence,

“the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is

one must “be aware of one’s own [prejudices] so that

the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies

the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus

tradition its power.” In the attempt to seek the

assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.”33

28

truth, the Enlightenment established as a self-evident

Eventually, if the text is sufficiently foreign,

truth that no prejudices be allowed in the pursuit of

one will be “pulled up short by the text.”34 That is

knowledge. This self-evident truth is a judgement

to say, there will be a word, phrase, or notion that

made prior to the engagement with the world. Hence,

challenges one’s pre-understanding of the text.

it is a prejudice on the manner in which one ought to

This will be cause for pause and reconsideration of

investigate the world.

one’s fore-projections and prejudices. Finally, one

Prejudices, in addition to fore-structures, create

will form an understanding of the text that allows

an anticipatory understanding of something yet to

engagement without pause. This new understanding

be engaged. In the case of a text, “[one] projects a

will then be a new set of fore-projections and

meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial

prejudices upon engaging the text once more. Here,

meaning emerges in the text.” That is to say, one has

the circle begins anew.

29

a fore-projection of the text. The initial understanding
of the words, phrases, and paragraphs as these
elements is fore-having. The initial perspective30 that
allows one to engage the particular parts of the text
is fore-sight. Finally, the initial interpretation of the
text as a text, the individual parts (words, phrases,
The totality of these fore-projections constitutes one’s

 Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 97.
A
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 97.
The Hermeneutic Circle, 235.
The Hermeneutic Circle, 233.
Making Space for Knowing, 70.

Consideration of Peirce
Gadamer, with the assistance of Heidegger, has
provided the framework that I shall use to describe the
way thoughts, in the Peircean sense, go from doubt to

paragraphs, etc.) as those parts is fore-conception.

26
27
28
29
30

Response to Gadamer and Heidegger in

an understanding. In particular, one begins with a preunderstanding of an object, said pre-understanding

31
32
33
34

— 5 —

 e Hermeneutic Circle, 235.
Th
The Hermeneutic Circle, 233.
The Hermeneutic Circle, 234.
The Hermeneutic Circle, 233.

Brian M. Sunguza
is then refuted by a new experience which creates

One might contest this claim and argue that

doubt and so leads thought to the production of a

an object can be identified without reference to

belief. Said belief will be one’s new understanding

function, and so meaning, but rather to sensations

of the object or objects in general. This new

in the Peircean sense. One might go on to say that

understanding will in turn be the pre-understanding

an object viewed as a distinct collection of sensations

when engaging objects anew. Here, the circular process

implies that said object is meaningless. For example,

of understanding has the potential to begin again.

the sight and touch of the keys on which one types

A reader may think that this is the hermeneutic

are sensations that are distinct from the sight of black

circle with Peirce’s thought added in. This is not

and touch of softness one receives from a couch.

so since the hermeneutic circle is a method more

Surely, the keys and the couch are identifiable by the

so than a process of understanding since it requires

distinct sensations received from them rather than

one to ‘be aware of one’s own prejudices,’ as quoted

their functions. Furthermore, as Peirce mentions,

above. I do not disagree with such a requirement;

these sensations are independent of what one thinks

however, at this point I am not interested in the

of them. The fact that one sees what one sees and

most effective process of understanding. Instead, I

feels what one feels is independent of any thought.

am concerned with the process thought goes through

This further emphasizes the point that objects

to obtain an understanding of an object. Hence, to

understood as distinct collections of sensations

prevent potential confusion I refrain from using the

are meaningless. Although one could question the

phrase ‘hermeneutic circle.’ Before describing the

integrity of the interpretation of these sensations as

step by step process, I begin by explaining certain

‘keys and a couch,’ the sensations are independent of

concepts, namely, meaningful objects, inferences from

the interpretation of them as meaningful objects since

sensations, and prejudices concerning an object.

they are a part of reality, in the Peircean sense. Hence,

35

Meaningful Objects. Although Gadamer’s work

objects as a collection of sensations are meaningless.

is in reference to a written text, a circular process of

This can appear quite convincing; however,

understanding also holds for the understanding of an

the observation that one set of sensations is distinct

object. As mentioned above, Heidegger’s description of

from another undermines the very position being

the significance of objects has to do with the meaning

argued for. When this past interlocutor senses,

of an object as a text. This description of an object

he categorizes his sensations in relation to certain

allows for one object to be delineated from another

functions. The keys as such are only so because he is

object. A car as a car is not a bottle as a bottle because

typing on them. The couch as such is only so because

the function, or meaning, of the former is not the

he is sitting on it. Neither one of these objects

same as the latter. Consequently, all objects as such can

exists as such within the sensations themselves.37

only be viewed as meaningful since an object is only

Rather, the object is a projection of meaning by

identifiable as such when a function is assigned to it.

the interpreter’s thoughts onto sensations. In other

36

words, the delineation of one object from another
one is in respect to the significance38 each object has
35 N
 o pun intended, but much appreciated.
36 Here, a text includes any object that is ‘readable,’ that is,
an object that presents a meaning that can be interpreted
such as a garbage can or a pen. Both of these objects
have, as Heidegger would endorse, a significance with
respect to the interpretation of their as-structures.

37 Th
 e descriptions of colors and pressures felt would be
associated to the function of the object rather than
descriptive of what the object is.
38 That is, the interpretation of the as-structure of the
object in one’s thoughts.
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in the thoughts of the interpreter of the sensations.

with ink that is stored within itself.40 In this way,

Although it is true that sensations are independent of

similarly to a text, one ‘reads’ an object as a means

the thinker, it is the thinker that organizes sensations

to understand the message of the author, he who

into an object by bestowing a function to a group of

organizes separate as-structures in such a way that a

sensations. Consequently, raw sensations are without

person within his community would recognize not

meaning but all objects are meaningful. Without

only a collection of objects, but a singular object with

such objects, we are left with the ceaseless totality

an intended meaning.41

of all sensations. This is certainly not the world of

In the case of inferring an as-structure, the

identifiable objects and so no discourse concerning

author’s intuition indicates to him a potential

distinct entities could be had.39 Instead, to discuss

function that a collection of sensations may serve.

objects is to discuss the different functions we infer

In this way, he infers the function of the collection

from and project upon sensations.

of sensations. This inference then becomes, to him,

Inferences from Sensations. The inference comes

an object. From then onward, the object would have

from one’s interpretation of what the as-structure of

an intended as-structure which may or may not be

an object should be given the sensations received.

inferred or ‘read’ by others.

From the discussion above, it can be understood that

Prejudices Concerning an Object. The inference

an object as such only comes into existence within the

one makes to ‘author’ an object or the meaning of an

thought of the interpreter. This is so since an object is

object one has already inherited can be understood

meaningful, and meaning is dependent on thought.

as prejudices concerning the function of the object.

This assigned meaning is the function one assigns

In other words, thought can inform one’s conclusion

a collection of sensations. In this way, when one

about the as-structure of an object prior to future

encounters a new object there is an act of ‘authoring’

engagement. For example, I can presume that

on the part of the interpreter.

bottles can only be as such if they are used to drink

An ‘author’ of an object would be the person

a liquid of some sort. However, this prejudice can be

that either intends to arrange separate as-structures

confronted by a change in or an additional use for

into a singular as-structure or infers an as-structure

a bottle. For example, one may use a bottle as such

from a particular collection of sensations. For the

to be a container of small stones and pebbles. Being

former, consider a ball point pen. The spring, the ink

confronted by such a foreign use of a bottle would

barrel, the gel, and the like all come together and are

challenge my prejudice of the as-structure of a bottle

intended to be understood as a tool to write. In this

strictly meaning the consumption of a liquid. As an

way, the spring as a spring, the ink as ink, and the
gel as gel disappear to become the intended pen as a
pen. This intended ‘message’ can be understood by
one with an understanding that has adapted itself to a
culture, community, and tradition where a pen exists
as an object, that is to say, where the as-structure of
a certain object is identified as being a tool to write

39 P
 erhaps such a silence would prove to ultimately be the
most appropriate way to be truthful in our speech. 

40 I t is important to note that there are various types of
pens which are reasonably understood as distinct that
share the as-structure I have just defined. I simply use
this example for the purposes of my paper, but I do
recognize the importance of describing the rich history
and context that should be provided for an accurate
description of the as-structure of an object.
41 To better understand this idea, consider a word.
Presumably, the distinct letters that make up ‘word,’
disappear and are understood as a singular object,
namely, a word. In this way, objects can come together
and disappear into a larger object. As another example,
consider the parts of a pen versus the actual pen.
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additional example, I was sitting in a patch of grass by

of a belief to settle the irritation that has begun. The

a lake and noticed that some of what appeared to be

doubt that thought will attempt to resolve would be

blades of grass were growing flowers. Here, my long

concerning the intended as-structure of the pen.

held prejudice that blades of grass as such were unable

Here, thought would recognize the inconsistency

to produce flowers was challenged. The examples

between one’s pre-understanding and the intended as-

above serve to indicate that one can have prejudices

structure of an object inferred from the sensations, in

concerning the meaning of a certain object which

the Peircean sense, received. In the case of the shock

implies that one can have prejudices about the as-

pen, one can infer that the intended as-structure of

structure of an object. Consequently, approaching an

the ‘pen’ is to be a device that shocks. Since doubt

object, one has a pre-understanding of the object since

was raised as a result of the engagement of reality,

one has both fore-structures and prejudices in respect

that is, the sensations one received, it follows that

to the object.

thought would settle one’s doubt by adjusting the

42

At a similar point, Gadamer goes on to say

pre-understanding to match the inferred intended as-

that one will be ‘pulled up short by the text,’ as

structure of the object. The reasoning is as follows.

quoted above, which will initiate the development of

Since the doubt was caused by an unfamiliar

understanding. Unlike a text that ‘speaks’ for itself,

sensation, thought has a constraint on what belief

so to speak, an object does not always articulate its

could satisfy this irritation. If thought finds a belief

own intended as-structure. The question then is,

that only removes the feeling of doubt, then the

how can an object confront the pre-understanding of

source of doubt would not be addressed. Unless

the object without stating in words something that

one never interacts with the object again, the same

challenges the prejudices? In other words, how does

doubt could be raised. Thought would need to form

one get pulled up short by an object?

a belief that sufficiently corresponds to the present

The Circular Process of Understanding. The

sensations received from the object in order to

pre-understanding of an object can be confronted

completely settle the doubt. Since the aim of thought

by the refutation of the prejudices concerning the

is to settle doubt, as Peirce rightly argues, it follows

as-structure of the object. I shall call this a new

that this belief, an informed understanding, should

experience. Suppose that a pen one ‘reads’ through

eventually be found. Hence, thought will form a belief

the senses is secretly a shocking device someone has

that would adjust one’s pre-understanding to match

planted as a prank. Convinced of one’s own pre-

the inferred intended as-structure of the object. In

understanding of this object as a tool to write, one

particular, thought may conclude that this so called

picks it up and presses down on the button. In doing

‘pen’ is actually a pranking device. Such an adapted

so, one’s nerves and beloved prejudices receive quite

understanding would be sufficient to cause the object

the shock! This unanticipated refutation of the pre-

to become familiar and so settle the source of doubt.

understanding of the as-structure of the object would

In the case one has never encountered such an

be cause for pause. Here, the Peircean doubt would

object, thought will ‘author,’ as described above, the

be raised, and thought will ‘spring’ into the pursuit

new object in respect to what one infers the as-structure
of the object to be.43 Thought will define the object

42 W
 hether blades of grass can truly produce flowers
depends on the accepted meaning of ‘a blade of grass’ by
the community of people that bestow meaning to this
life form.

43 I n this manner, people bestow meaning onto the world
and create the realm of objects, that is, the meaningful
organization of sensations.
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in such a way as to prevent the object from refuting

incompatibility will cause doubt concerning the

one’s prejudices again. Returning to the example above,

comprehensiveness of one’s understanding. This doubt

one will not think of the object as a tool to write, but

will spur thought to find a belief. Since thought’s aim

surely as something else that sufficiently captures the

is simply the formation of any belief that will remove

sensations received so as to prevent doubt from being

the feeling of doubt, it is important that once the

raised when engaging the object again.

doubt has been raised, one engages further with the

One’s newfound understanding of the object

object. Leaving the object after the doubt had been

will then become a part of a new pre-understanding

raised will result in susceptibility to a rationalization

of objects. Such a pre-understanding will then

of the incompatibility as a means to settle the feeling

either be confronted by an unexpected intended

of doubt. Consequently, the ‘understanding’ of the

as-structure that can be recognized by oneself or a

object will be a fiction rather than a meaningful idea.

collection of sensations with the potential for an as-

As mentioned above, this is no way to resolve the

structure to be inferred. Here, the process described

source of doubt which is ultimately the source of

above repeats in response to doubt and ultimately

understanding. Hence, continued engagement with

settles when all possible objects corresponding to said

the object is of great importance.

doubt are comprehended.

Initially, one should engage an object with one’s
senses until one achieves a sufficiently comprehensive

Part II:

understanding of the object. Upon first engagement,

Harnessing the Circular

doubt, in the form of reflexive questioning will rise
about each new sensation detected. Thought will

Process of Understanding

promptly answer each question. Since the object

As an initial step, similar to the hermeneutic circle,
the prejudices concerning an object and the nature of
understanding must be made conscious to the greatest
extent possible. This should be done through an
attempt to articulate one’s beliefs. At any point in the
articulation where one is in a possible contradiction
or is clueless on how to proceed, doubt shall be raised,
and thought will form a belief. Since one is engaging
thought, the prejudice(s) which is accepted as the
way to make apparent one’s beliefs would be invisible
to oneself. Surely, many other similarly profound
prejudices would not be visible despite their influence
on one’s perspective. These will remain hidden until
some new experience refutes them. Nonetheless,
to ensure one can begin understanding an external
object, expectations and prejudices must be made
conscious to the greatest extent possible.
Doing so will allow for any incompatibilities

is in ‘view,’ so to speak, thought will not be able to
concoct a fiction that is independent of the sensations.
Although the beliefs it forms may not be ultimately
true, they will be justified. Although the perfection
of understanding may not occur with this simple
engagement, through a sufficient number of cycles
of the circular process of understanding described
above, one’s understanding and the object would
seemingly become one in the same. That is to say, one
will sufficiently understand the intended as-structure
of the object. As a result, there would be no more
motivation for thought to uncover potentially hidden
worlds44 within the object. Since nonintentional
engagement through the senses is exhausted, the
next step in this method would be the intentional
engagement of the object through experimentation
and two types of meaningful questions.

between thoughts and the intended as-structure of
an object to become apparent. Noticing such an

44 Th
 ese could be the separate objects that are held together
in some way to make a singular object.
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The first of these questions is what I call the

must ask the following question: why, given sensational

‘how question,’ that is, how would this object interact

expectations and prejudices, did such an interaction

with another object? Before considering this question

occur? I call this the ‘why question.’46

in depth, I define the source of the possible answers,

The why question will lead thought to directly

namely, intuitions. An intuition is any member of

reconsider expectations and prejudices (for brevity, I

the set of all possible arrangements of sensational

use the term ‘pre-understanding’ to capture both ideas)

expectations and prejudices through habits of

about the object. Given the arguments presented

mind. A sensational expectation, as I define it, is an

above, the reader might think that thought would have

anticipation of the sensations to be received from an

already done so to begin with. This is not necessarily

object. According to Peirce “[t]hat which determines

true because thought could form a fiction that would

us, from given premises, to draw one inference rather

preserve one’s pre-understanding. The ‘why question’

than another, is some habit of mind, whether it be

provides thought with an orientation and boundary

constitutional or acquired.” In other words, a habit

to compensate for the lack of present sensation of the

of mind is either an internal disposition or a learned

interaction just had. The reader might grow suspicious

‘mental behavior’ that makes us interpret experiences

here and claim that I have contradicted myself. Stating

one way rather than other. These habits constitute

that I previously claimed that sensations prevent

the initial understanding of an object since they

thought from concocting a fiction, whilst here I

are thoughts that lead to a response to a stimulus,

claim that thought can concoct a fiction despite the

namely, the sensations from the object. When the

sensations received from the interaction mentioned

how question is posed, one will naturally have an

above. This would be a fair charge if I had not been

intuition of a possible answer, that is, one will have an

careful to specify that thought, bounded by present

idea of what may occur given one’s past experiences,

sensations, would not formulate a fiction. Once a

prejudices, and habits of mind.

sensation has passed into memory, it is no longer

45

As a requirement, one must then make the

present and so thought would have no boundary

two objects interact in a way that aims to make

preventing the formulation of a fiction to settle the

the intuitions real. If the interaction matches one’s

feeling of doubt. Here, the common saying ‘out

intuitions, then the intuitions can be considered part

of sight, out of mind,’ would take on real force.

of the understanding of the object and its properties.

Since the sensations are ‘out of sight,’ thought may

If, on the other hand, the interaction refutes one’s

conclude that they should be ‘out of mind.’ As Peirce

intuitions, then doubt would be raised, and thought

demonstrated, such a conclusion will only result in a

would be on the pursuit of an understanding since

fiction. The ‘why question’ reduces the possibility of a

thought is being motivated by sensations. However, to

fiction by providing a boundary for belief formation,

further ensure thought expands understanding rather

namely, the memory of past sensations. By placing

than formulates a fiction as a means to preserve one’s

this memory in the forefront of one’s mind, along

prejudices during the process of belief formation, one

with one’s pre-understanding, thought can form an
understanding of the interaction observed.

45 Fixation of Belief, 120.

46 Th
 e prejudice involved in the question that interactions
happen for a mechanical reason serves as a productive
boundary for thought.
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Per the circular process of understanding,

asked as a means to orient thought to the formulation

this understanding would become one’s new pre-

of yet an even more comprehensive understanding of

understanding concerning the object. As a next step in

the object. Said understanding will be a part of one’s

the method of obtaining an understanding, one would

new pre-understanding. Here, the cycle repeats and

need to ask a modified ‘how question.’ In particular,

should continue to the satisfaction of all doubt or for

one would need to ask: how will this object react to

other reasons such as ethical concerns.

other objects given one’s new pre-understanding? As with

The final part of this method would be the

the previous ‘how question,’ one will have intuitions

articulation of one’s understanding in a way that

about possible answers. Through experimentation, one

is understandable to others. This step is important

could sift through each intuition. If the object reacts

because another perspective can serve as a refutation

as expected, then nothing need be done. If the object

to the prejudices that are invisible to oneself. However,

reacts in a way that refutes all of one’s intuitions about

the details of such a step are beyond the bounds of

the object, then another ‘why question’ should be

this paper and so are left for some future date.
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